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In the context of the publication of Agenda 2000 and the accelerated progress of the Irish
economy from 1993, the Republic of Ireland’s1 position in relation to Structural Fund transfers
generally, and qualification for Objective 1 status specifically, has undergone substantial
revision since 1997. Against this backdrop, Ireland lodged a formal application with Eurostat
in November 1998 to divide the country into two regions, one which would continue to qualify
for Objective 1 funds, the other qualifying only for “Objective 1 in transition” status. This
“regionalisation” strategy proved to generate substantial controversy both within and between
the European Union (EU), the Irish government, and existing regional and local authorities
and development agencies. These controversies were rooted in the need to transform the highly
centralist scale division of the Irish state. At one level, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate
the significance of these conflicts in the light of recent debate in political geography regarding
the conditions which serve to ground the EU’s broader philosophy of a Europe of the Regions
in particular ways, in particular places, at particular times. More generally, however, in respect
to both its chosen methodology and findings, the paper hopes to contribute to the development
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Introduction
In July 1997, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) published
Agenda 2000, a blueprint for the future strategic direction of the European Union
(EU) (CEC, 1997a,b). To Ireland, a country which has enjoyed considerable success
in attracting Structural and Cohesion Funds, this document was the bearer of bad
news. With a desire among net contributors to reduce EU transfers and a need to
divert resources to those central and eastern European countries hoping to join the
Union, it was clear that Ireland could not reasonably hope to benefit from the levels
of funding it had secured historically. Moreover, as a result of formidable economic
growth since 1993, the country had exceeded the EU threshold required to qualify
for full Objective 1 status and was to be labelled an “Objective 1 in transition area”,
receiving a diminishing amount of resources annually.
Against this backdrop, Ireland lodged a formal application with Eurostat in Nov-
ember 1998 to divide the country into two regions, one which would continue to
qualify for Objective 1 funds, the other qualifying only for Objective 1 in transition
status. This regionalisation strategy generated substantial controversy both within
and between the EU, the Irish government, and existing regional and local authorities
and development agencies. These controversies were rooted in the need to transform
the highly centralist scale division of the Irish state. The purpose of this paper is to
evaluate the significance of these conflicts in the light of recent debate in political
geography regarding the role of the EU in changing territorial structures of the state
(Keating & Loughlin, 1996; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Brenner, 1999). It is writ-
ten in the belief that a deconstruction of conflicts reveals important insights into the
conditions which serve to ground the EU’s broader philosophy of a Europe of the
Regions in particular ways, in particular places, at particular times. In so doing, the
broader aim of the paper, both in terms of its chosen methodology and findings, is
to contribute to the recent development of a process based approach to the contem-
porary (re)scaling of governance.
The paper is structured around five sections. In the first section, a theoretical con-
text for the Irish case study will be elaborated. Second, the scale division of the Irish
state will then be explored. Third, Ireland’s historical relationship with the EU will
be documented, and the manner in which Agenda 2000 altered this relationship,
examined. Fourth, using a chronological framework, the main body of the article
will then turn towards a detailed exposition of the controversies surrounding the
regionalisation strategy. In the final section, an effort will made to tease out those
features of Ireland’s political system which were most responsible for grounding
Agenda 2000, and therein, to reflect upon the wider significance of the case study
for future work which seeks to examine the processes lying behind the contemporary
construction of the “region” as a key site of governance.
Euro-regionalism and struggles over scales of governance
Considerable attention has been paid recently to the variety of structures of govern-
ance which are emerging at the urban and regional scales which are serving to play
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an increasing role in the fashioning of the development trajectories of local and
regional economies. Amidst the morass of published material which has taken this
“institutional turn” in urban and regional political economy as its focus, MacLeod
and Goodwin’s recent critical intervention stands as a beacon. According to MacLeod
and Goodwin (1999), for all its diversity, work in this area is characterised by a key
analytic flaw. In so far as the different institutional ensembles which mark different
urban and regional economies are accepted as a given, approaches to date have failed
to take seriously enough the need to account for the conditions under which structures
of governance settle at different spatial scales in the first instance.
In an effort to deepen interest in the processes underpinning the contemporary
(re)scaling of urban and regional levels as key sites of governance, MacLeod and
Goodwin (1999) advocate greater attention to three factors; the need to outline one’s
chosen object of enquiry more clearly and therein to shift the epistemological gaze
to structures of urban and regional governance themselves; the need to interrogate
more fully the relational interplay between economic development, governance and
scale; and finally the need to more fully appreciate the role of the wider politics of
representation and active processes of political strategizing through which economic
development is itself constituted.
Albeit focusing upon specific theories of urban and regional governance, MacLeod
and Goodwin’s thesis resonates with a number of developments within contemporary
political geography (Delaney & Leitner, 1997). Against the backdrop of a collection
of forces which are serving to de-territorialise and re-territorialise state institutions
(Brenner, 1998, 1999) Swyengedouw (1997), for instance, has called for a process
approach to the understanding of geographical scale, in which the settling down of
state functions at different geographical tiers is seen to be a function of social and
political struggles occurring at a variety of scales. For Swyengedouw, the tendency
to naturalise scales such as the nation, region or the local as obvious sites of govern-
ance needs to be resisted. Political space is constructed out of particular historical
conditions and normally only after considerable contestation. And whilst these con-
testations give legitimacy to some scales over others and through time come to reify
what Cox (1998a) calls the “scale division of the state”, they are always liable to
re-ignition.
It is against this backdrop that the phenomenon of the Europe of the Regions
should be approached. Since the ratification of the Single European Act in 1987 and
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU has pursued a vision of a Europe of the Regions
(Nanetti, 1996; Michie & Fitzgerald, 1997). With the underlying goal of strengthen-
ing local and regional democracies and creating better and more sustainable pro-
grammes of regional development, the EU has sought to use the lever of the Struc-
tural Funds to mobilise regional actors to form a core element in a new structure of
multi-level governance. According to Hooghe (1996): 88–89:
“The core of the script since 1989 is known as partnership, a principle and a
particular set of organisational structures for collaboration among the European
Commission, the state executive, and sub-national authorities. The objective was
to empower sub-national authorities in the European arena from member states
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where they are extremely weak, and by specifying how this empowerment should
be organised, to achieve a uniform pattern of sub-national involvement. It was an
ambitious attempt to transform, in this policy area, the Europe without the regions
into a Europe with all regions.”
Following MacLeod (1999), the phrase Euro-regionalism will be used herein to refer
to this desire on the behalf of the EU to stimulate a growth in regional level govern-
ance.
There has been a tendency in many studies seeking to understand the impact of
Euro-regionalism to lapse into a descriptive mode in which vague notions such as
the hollowing out of the nation state are invoked as a given. The rise of regional
governance is simply asserted and insufficient attention is given to the underlying
processes of structuration through which the contemporary re-scaling of the state is
being constituted. According to MacLeod (1999): 247–248:
“Merely to assert [new regional structures] as an outcome of some ineluctable
structural transition to a post-Fordist economy and hollowed out state will tell us
little about the political structuration or institutional shaping of any emerging map
of Euro-regional governance. To understand the eccentric and uneven contours of
the latter, we would be well-advised to explore the determinate social relations
and ‘politics of place’ and ‘scale’ that serve to activate particular instances of
Euro-regionalism.”
Moreover, even when foregrounding political contestation, many studies have tended
to be somewhat mechanistic. The nuances, emotions, passions, and personalities of
political conflicts have tended to be glossed over in favour of somewhat dry and
sweeping summaries of their outcomes. This has derived, in part, from the choice
of research methods. In-depth qualitative work offering thick description of struggles
has tended to be by-passed in favour of somewhat distant third person, factual com-
mentary. Approaching the differential ways in which the Europe of the Regions
project embeds itself in different member states through the lens of a process
approach to the scaling of governance, then, might require greater use of a research
method that can account for the conjunctural, the complex, and the contextual
(MacLeod, 1999: 232).
Perhaps the most impressive collection of essays which have examined Euro-
regionalism within the spirit of the process based approach are those edited by
Hooghe (1996). Hooghe (1996: 122) defines his research agenda to comprise a desire
to understand how regional “policies are made through a mixture of uneven, unequal,
unstable relationships and a compound of co-operative and unilateral strategies.”
Here, attention has been given to the ways in which institutional outcomes (the nature
and extent of regional governance) reflect struggles over visions of governance held
by the EU, nation states, and an array of regional and local actors.
In Hooghe’s collection, the extent to which the EU has succeeded in invigorating
local and regional actors is seen to be complicated by the highly differentiated nature
of existing territorial structures of states (Rhodes, 1995; Le Gales, 1998; Benz &
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Eberlein, 1999). To date, the relative power of different tiers of government to devise
regional development plans, negotiate these plans with the Commission, agree final
Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) and Operational Programmes (OPs), and
implement, monitor, and evaluate plans, has tended to reflect a priori structures
(Marks, 1996; Bachtler & Turok, 1997). This point made, according to Hooghe, it
would, nonetheless, be misleading to conclude that Euro-regionalism has made no
impact on the institutional fabric of member states.
In his review of the extent to which the architecture of regional governance has
been modified in the light of the 1989 to 1993 round of Structural Funds, Marks
(1996), for instance, notes a number of new developments. In the more centralised
state systems that prevail in both Ireland and Greece, Structural Funds have suc-
ceeded in generating calls for greater devolution among sub-national actors. More-
over, in more decentralised states such as Spain and Belgium, Structural Funds have
fed into deeper processes of regional devolution rooted in ethno–cultural conflicts,
and thus have served to consolidate a regionalisation of state functions. In France,
Germany, and the UK meanwhile, whilst the rigid institutionalisation of existing
national–regional relations has made these structures generally impervious to influ-
ence, space has been created for some regional actors to play an increased role.
Through an exploration of a series of struggles which surrounded the latest phase
in the grounding of Euro-regionalism in Ireland, this paper intends to contribute to
the development of a richer application of a process based approach to the scaling
of governance in this context (see also Baeten, Swyngedouw & Albrechts, 1999;
MacLeod, 1999). In choosing a methodology which seeks to explore the detailed
contours of political contestation, and in telling the story in a way which captures
the messiness of conflicts on the ground, the intention is to contribute towards an
understanding of “the social, economic, political, and ideological forces that appear
to be constituting specific scales such as the ‘region’, and multi-scalar matrices such
as Euro-regionalism, as the hegemonic scalar fixes of late capitalism” (MacLeod,
1999: 248).
Euro-regionalism and the scale division of the Irish state
The scale division of the Irish state sets a vital context within which to understand
the Irish engagement with Euro-regionalism. The Irish state is comprised of two
tiers, central and local, and as such, is one of the few states in Europe to lack any
meaningful form of regional government. Moreover, central government dominates
public life and local government is extremely weak. A British inheritance from 1898
legislation, local government rests at the County level (Fig. 2), and is comprised of
a series of County Councils and County Boroughs. Until 1999, these bodies lacked
any constitutional status. Historically, they have been allowed a limited range of
competencies and have been subjected to strict ultra-vires regulation (McCafferty &
Walsh, 1999). Furthermore, Ireland is somewhat unique in that local administrators
rather than local politicians exert greatest power at the local level with the County
manager being perhaps the most powerful player. Under 5% of GDP and only around
12% of public expenditure is discharged through local government (Laffan, 1996).
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Whilst lacking a formal regional tier of government, it would be misleading to
infer that the regional scale is bereft of any institutions. Three types of regional
actors can be identified; regional arms of national organisations, Europe inspired
regional authorities, and regional development agencies. In the first instance, a var-
iety of national agencies have organised themselves on a regional basis. These
include the Irish Development Agency (IDA) and the various regional Health Boards.
Controlled by strong centralist administrations, these regional bodies lack any mean-
ingful decision making powers and represent little more than delivery mechanisms
for national programmes.
Secondly, Eurostat, up to 1999 at least, has viewed Ireland in its entirety as a
NUTS II region.2 As a direct consequence of pressure from the EU in the 1994–
1999 round of Structural Fund allocations, Ireland, nevertheless, established eight
new regional authorities which were ascribed NUTS III status (Fig. 1). These auth-
orities were controlled by committees drawn from politicians involved in local
government. To date, regional authorities have had relatively little power. With a
tiny staff contingent and no budget, their main role has been to monitor the ways
in which Structural Funds have been spent. Although based upon an amalgamation
of existing County boundaries, the geographical parameters of these authorities are
somewhat artificial and they have lacked widespread public recognition and support.
Finally, Ireland also has number of regional development organisations with remits
to develop geographically discrete areas (Callanan, 1999). These include Shannon
Free Airport Development Company (SFADCo), U´ dara´s na Gaeltachts, and more
recently and importantly in the present context, the Council for the West and its
institutional offshoot the Western Development Commission. The Council for the
West was established in the early 1990s. Dubbed the “Bishops Initiative”, it grew
first as a lobby group concerned with the erosion of the social, economic, and cultural
base of the west of the country. With the support of the then Taoiseach Albert
Reynolds, T.D. for the North-Western seat of Longford-Roscommon (Fig. 2), the
Council grew to include a wider constituency of social and economic partners. In
response to the Council’s publication of a Challenge Document, the Irish Govern-
ment formally established the Western Development Commission in 1997, and
placed it into legislative stature in February 1999. Covering a total of seven counties
in the North-West of Ireland (Fig. 2), the Western Development Commission has
powers to make loans for economic development from a IR£25 million Investment
Fund (Western Development Commission, 1999).
Ireland then, is best characterised in terms of a strong centralist political culture,
a weak system of local government, and a somewhat ad hoc patchwork quilt of
relatively weak regional actors. From this brief sketch, it is useful to draw attention
to three aspects of the scale division of the Irish state that have proven key in shaping
its engagement with Euro-regionalism; the national scale dependencies of local and
2 The acronym NUTS is derived from Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical Units, and refers to the
geographical scales which Eurostat uses for statistical purposes. Until 2000 Ireland was recognised by
the EU as a NUTS II level in its entirety.
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Fig. 1. NUTS II and NUTS III Regional Authority areas.
regional state actors, the limited development of a regional imaginary, and the de-
localisation of local interests. First, constructed as a centralist regime, sub-national
arms of the Irish state are characterised by their limited degree of local dependency.
The concept of local dependency, first coined by Cox and Mair (1988), refers to the
dependencies of various state and non-state actors on the reproduction of certain
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Fig. 2. County boundaries and area of responsibility of the Western Development Commission.
social relations within a prescribed territory. Financed and controlled from Dublin,
both local government and the various regional actors identified above lack strong
dependencies on sub-national spaces for their own existence. As such, the material
bases for these actors to spearhead local and regional development trajectories is lim-
ited.
Second, both MacLeod (1999) and MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) point to the
critical importance of the politics of representation in the grounding of Euro-
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regionalism in specific localities. Here, distinctive regional identities or regional
imaginaries prove to be a vital precursor to the erection of an institutional ensemble
at the regional scale. These identities animate regional armatures to map and give
meaning to the national space in ways which naturalise the belief that these spaces
therein require distinctive forms of state intervention. In part a result of the existing
scale division of the state, it is clear that Ireland is marked by an absence of regional
imaginaries. To be sure the ancient Provinces of Ulster, Munster, Connacht and
Leinester do continue to have meaning for some people but they have no contempor-
ary administrative relevance. The existing patchwork quilt of regional agencies are
marked by the way they cut across one another and map onto national space only
weakly. As Laffan (1996): 322, notes:
“The counties provide a critical focus for collective identity within Ireland,
although their importance as an arena of identity owes more to Gaelic games than
to vibrant local politics% Powerful local identities are matched by a strong sense
of national identity, which leaves little room for intermediate identities. The unify-
ing nature of Irish nationalist mobilisation meant that little popular sentiment was
attached to the ancient provinces.”
Bereft of strong regional identities, it is unsurprising that the scale division of the
Irish state has failed to give serious contemplation to the erection of a regional archi-
tecture.
Finally, Ireland is marked by a de-localisation of local and regional interests, as
local and regional lobby groups channel their activities directly through the national
political system. In the United States context, Cox (1998b) has called for more atten-
tion to be paid to these de-localisation tendencies. Here, actors with strong local and
regional scale dependencies attempt to colonise central branches of the state and
harness the powers of State and Federal governments. Perhaps because of the relative
weakness of the central state in the United States, national government is constantly
vulnerable to cannibalisation by local interests. Unlike typical parliamentary systems
therefore, where party allegiance is strong and representation of a strictly territorial
nature marginalised, the emphasis is on the “strength of the relation between the
legislator and his/her constituency as opposed to that existing between legislator and
Party” (Cox, 1998b: 3).
With a strong central government of the classic parliamentary form, one might
anticipate that Ireland would be the last state in which turf politics triumphed over
party allegiance. Such a conclusion would be erroneous. The structure of the Irish
state is one that facilitates the expression of local interests through respective Irish
parliamentarians (Sinnott, 1986). Whilst it would be misleading to downplay the
significance of strong central parties, it is nevertheless true to say that:
“Irish parliamentarians (T.D.s) are almost all natives of the areas they represent
and a very high portion of them (60%) continue to serve on their local councils
while in the Da´il. Irish parliamentary representatives engage in extensive constitu-
ency work, acting as brokers between their constituencies and the state. A local
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political base and a record of service to the locality is vital for electoral success.
Localism and brokerage are prevalent not just because of Ireland’s size and cul-
ture, but because the state tradition is so centralised. T.D.s act as intermediaries
between their constituents and a remote state in Dublin.” (Laffan, 1996: 321)
Agenda 2000: a new context for Ireland
It is against the backdrop of this scale division of the state that Ireland’s engage-
ment with EU Structural Funds in general, and Agenda 2000 in particular, needs to
be understood. Ireland joined the EU in 1973 as one of the poorest member states,
with a GDP per capita of 62% of the EU average (McAleese & Mathews, 1987).
Despite economic growth, in both the 1988 and 1994 round of Structural Fund allo-
cations, it qualified for full Objective 1 status, a classification reserved for those
areas with a GDP per capita of less than 75% of the EU average (Walsh, 1995). As
one of Europe’s most underdeveloped countries (Peillon, 1994), Ireland has emerged
as a substantial net recipient of Structural Fund transfers (Murray, Greer & Walsh,
1995). Between 1988 and 1999, it received the largest per capita transfers of any
EU country (Laffan, 1999: 12). Further, in 1992, along with Spain, Greece and Portu-
gal, it also began to benefit from the new Cohesion Fund.
Ireland’s embrace of this new treasure chest did not involve any new institutional
innovation; “adaptation to the demands of EU membership did not entail major
changes in Ireland’s administrative culture or its system of public policy. Servicing
the Brussels machine was grafted onto the existing machinery of government”
(Laffan & O’Donnell, 1998: 169). Given the highly centralist scale division of the
state, it has been central government and in particular the Department of Finance
that has played the key role in the formulation and negotiation of the two National
Development Plans which constituted the country’s Community Support Frameworks
in the 1988–1993 and 1994–1999 rounds of funds (O’Donnell & Walsh, 1995). The
aims of the Department of Finance have simply been to maximise the take of funds
and then, on a national bases, plan for their disbursement.
In July 1997, the European Commission published Agenda 2000, the Com-
mission’s blueprint for the future strategic direction of the European Union (CEC,
1997a,b). Informing the document were two important factors. First, financial pro-
visions had to be made regarding requests for accession from a number of central
and eastern European states. It was recommended that beyond current discussions
with Cyprus and Malta, accession negotiations should be opened with Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia, with a view to incorporation by
2005 (Andrews, 1998). Second, the financial framework was influenced by vigorous
calls among substantial net contributors (especially Germany) to reduce their contri-
butions (Bachtler, 1998).
For Ireland, the likely financial retrenchment arising from these two factors was
compounded by its remarkably successful rate of economic growth since 1993.
Whilst per capita GDP stood at around IR£7500 in 1992, by 1997 it had reached
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over IR£11,000 (Laffan, 1999). During this period, annual growth rates of up to 9%
earned the country the title Celtic Tiger. A consequence of this rapid economic
growth was that Ireland quickly changed from being a relatively poor nation to one
whose income now came close to the European average (O’Leary, 1997, 1999). In
the years 1994–1996, for instance, Eurostat estimated the country’s GDP per capita
to be 88%, 92%, and 98% of the EU average, respectively (Border Regional Auth-
ority, 1998a). The problem this presented was that against the likely backdrop of an
already diminished budget, Ireland had now breached the ceiling of 75% of the EU
average GDP per capita set for regions to qualify for full Objective 1 status.3
By 1998, it had become apparent to the Irish government that perhaps the existing
network of eight NUTS III regional authorities could be used to maximise Structural
Fund allocations for the period 2000–2006. It was clear that whilst the entire country
would breach the 75% threshold, at least three NUTS III regions, Border, Midlands
and West (referred to as the BMW group) had GDP per capitas beneath this level
(O’Leary, 1999) (Table 1). Perhaps one way to rescue Ireland from the worst
excesses of Agenda 2000 would be for the country to adopt a regionalisation strategy,
in which it would be divided into two new NUTS II regions; the BMW group qualify-
ing for Objective 1 status, and the remainder being subsumed into an Objective 1
in transition area (Fig. 1). It was against this context that struggles over scales of
governance began.
Social struggles and the scaling of governance: debates in Ireland over the
regionalisation strategy
Vigorous debate over Ireland’s strategy towards the next round of Structural Fund
allocations began in Spring 1998 and continued until final resolution to Agenda 2000
3 Among the more important details of Agenda 2000 which affected Ireland were the following:
1. EU Budget 2000–2006 — to be maintained at 1.27% of EU GNP with the Structural Fund budget
limited to a ceiling of 0.45% of EU GNP.
2. Structural Funds — 275 billion ECU (1997 prices) to be available between 2000–2006. 45 billion
ECU to go to accession states, 210 billion ECU to be spent on existing member states and 20 billion
ECU to be available through the Cohesion Fund. No country to receive monies exceeding 4% of
their GNP.
3. Structural Fund Objectives — 7 Objectives previously used for targeting funds were to be reduced to
3. Objective 1 funds to be targeted towards the most lagging regions. Objective 1 and 2 regions to be
reduced from 51% to 35–40% of EU’s population. Threshold for Objective 1 would be strictly applied
at 75% of EU GDP per capita. Eurostat, the “independent” statistical agency would make final
decisions on eligibility. Eligibility for Objective 1 would be based upon average GDP figures for the
period 1994–1996. Regions losing Objective 1 status were to be given Objective 1 in transition status.
Support for transition areas would be gradually reduced to nil by the end of 2006.
4. Cohesion Fund — Fund still available to nations with GNP per capita figures less than 90% of the
EU average, subject to mid term review (2003).
5. Community Initiatives — number of Community Initiatives would be reduced from 13 to 5, and from
9% to 5% of the budget. Inter-Reg and Leader would be maintained and a new Equal initiative would
be established (CEC (1997a,b) and Border Regional Authority (1998a)).
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Table 1
Economic performance of the Irish regions 1991–1995a
Region GDP per capita IR£ per person GDP per capita as a % of EU
average
1991 1995 Change % 1994 1995
Border 5909 7666 29.7 71.6 71.1
Midlands 5416 7125 32.9 63.5 66.1
West 5389 6943 28.8 60.6 64.4
Dublin and 8430 12007 42.4 105.6 111.3
Mid-East
South-West 7519 10537 40.1 90.9 97.7
Mid-West 6712 9386 39.8 85.6 87.0
South-East 6452 8575 32.9 79.2 79.5
State 7169 9925 38.4 88 92
a Source: compiled from O’Leary (1998): Table 1, and Border Regional Authority (1998a: 28).
was reached at the Berlin Summit in late March 1999. A wide variety of sources of
information were marshalled to shed light on the events of this particular period. As
impressed above, adopting a process based approach to the scaling of governance
carries with it certain methodological obligations. As MacLeod (1999: 231),
observes, it calls for an added sensitivity towards the “politics of place”, and “the
contingent and the contextual, when analysing the re-composition and re-scaling of
European urban and regional governance”. To gain insight into processes requires
insertion into the muddle that often surrounds public debates. In-depth qualitative
research methods are of critical importance.
To this end, the account presented below draws upon three principle sources of
information. First, every copy of The Irish Times, Irish Independent, and Ireland
Today published between March 5th 1998 and September 30th 1999 was reviewed,
and further information from local newspapers sourced where relevant.4 Second, cop-
ies were obtained of all debates held in the Houses of the Oireachtas on the
regionalisation strategy specifically, and Agenda 2000 discussions more generally,
between January 1st 1998 and September 30th 1999. This material covered all rel-
evant debates held in the Da´il (lower house) and Seanad (upper house) and associated
speeches and press releases, and all relevant Parliamentary Committee Meetings.5
4 Both The Irish Times and Irish Independent are leading daily newspapers and publish same day
editions on the WWW (www.ireland.com/ and www.independent.ie/). The Irish Times carries a special
section on European issues — Euro Times — which gives excellent coverage of debates across the EU.
Ireland Today is a daily newspaper on the WWW (www.ireland-today.ie/) and is largely designed for
migrants in the Irish diaspora. A range of local and regional newspapers are also published on the WWW
(www.niceone.com/newspap.htm).
5 Full transcriptions of Da´il and Seanad debates, minutes from Parliamentary Committees, and details
of press releases from the Taoiseach’s Office are published on the official Irish Government WWW
page (www.irlgov.ie/).
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Finally, a total of 13 semi-structured interviews were held between May and July
1999 with a number of key actors in the sphere of regional and local development.6
In the sections to follow, I aim to use material collected from these three sources
to reconstruct the key debates which took place over the regionalisation strategy.
Employing a chronological framework in order to remain faithful to the way in which
debates unfolded on the ground, discussion is structured around six major themes;
the role of Agenda 2000 in the mobilisation of existing “regional armatures”, the
arguments pursued in the Da´il and Seanad against the regionalisation strategy during
the “summer of discontent”, concern over the extent of regional devolution in Ireland,
the government’s announcement that it was to pursue regionalisation, the role of
political corruption in the mediation of negotiations, and the period of negotiation
and compromise leading to the final deal struck in Berlin.
Agenda 2000 and the mobilisation of regional armatures
The possibility that Ireland might adopt a regionalisation strategy in a bid to avert
the worse excesses of Agenda 2000 proved a stimulant to those regional armatures
most likely to benefit — the Border, Midlands, and West (BMW) regional authorities
and the Western Council and Western Development Commission. Regional bodies
were used by a range of representatives from the private sector (for instance, Cham-
bers of Commerce, farmers associations, environmental consultants, and utility
companies), voluntary organisations (for example women’s networks and anti-pov-
erty groups), branches of the local state (for instance, County Councils, Health
Boards, and County Enterprise Boards), and a range of other public bodies (such as
Universities, FA´ S, and Forbairt), as a vehicle through which contributions to the
next National Development Plan might be made. However trivial, the growth of
these new relationships suggested that the regional bodies were at last beginning to
thread into and form part of emerging regional “social blocks”.
On February 6th 1998, the Minister of Finance invited Ireland’s eight NUTS III
regional authorities to make submissions by the end of June 1998 for the next
National Development Plan. Despite their artificial creation and relative lack of
power, the BMW authorities spearheaded calls from a range of constituencies for
the regionalisation strategy to be implemented. Beyond the fact that they had not
benefited as much as other regions from the rise of the Celtic Tiger, a wide range
additional arguments were used in the BMW submissions in support of their claims
6 Interviews were conducted with two NUTS III regional authorities (one in (Midlands) and one outside
(Mid West) the proposed Objective 1 area), the two main regional development agencies in Ireland (again
one in (Western Development Commission) and one lying beyond (Shannon) the proposed Objective 1
area), and representatives from nine County Enterprise Boards (at least one from each of the eight NUTS
III regions — Waterford, South Cork, Limerick City, Galway, Clare, Offaly, Sligo, Dublin City, and
West-Meath). A total of 35 County Enterprise Boards were established in Ireland under the Operational
Programme “Local Urban and Rural Development” in the 1994–1999 CSF. Their function is to promote
the establishment and growth of small companies in their areas. The interviews proved useful in clarifying
the detail of particular debates, including the movers and shakers behind agendas and the relative weight
to be given to different viewpoints.
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for Objective 1 recognition. The Border Regional Authority (1998a,b) for instance,
pointed to economic retardation caused by the political and civil strife of being adjac-
ent to Northern Ireland, the fact that it was in the front line in the peace process,
and that it now had to deal with the new competitive threats of Economic and Monet-
ary Union without the UK. Midland Regional Authority (1998) pointed to the con-
tinued over-reliance on agriculture in the region, its weakly developed urban fabric,
infrastructure and telecommunications base, and its relative backwardness as a tourist
attraction. Finally, the West Regional Authority (1998) cited as its major difficulties
the region’s rural based economy and dependency upon a declining agricultural sec-
tor, its generally poor infrastructure, the problems caused by population decline and
out-migration, and the social and economic imbalances which exist between Galway
city and its rural hinterland.
The existence of the Council for the West alongside the Western Development
Commission also ensured a powerful lobby group for western counties inside the
proposed Objective 1 area. Lying outside government, the Council for the West was
more polemical in its demands. Lying inside the Irish state structure, the Western
Development Commission needed to be more guarded but nevertheless exercised
better channels of access to key decision makers in Dublin. Marian Harkin, Chair-
person of the Council for the West, emerged as one of the most vigorous public
advocates of regionalisation, whilst Liam Scollan, Chief Executive of the Western
Development Commission, also made repeated calls for the retention of Objective
1 status (Western Development Commission, 1999).
Alert to the fact that the EU would insist that any division of the country must
be accompanied by a greater role for regional authorities, these various regional
armatures also used the context set by Agenda 2000 to push for more power to be
devolved from Dublin. Crucially however, there were no serious calls for the erection
of substantial new regional authorities with wide ranging powers and enjoying the
privilege of suffrage. Instead, calls for devolution amounted to little more than the
introduction of spatial as opposed to national/sectoral planning and an enhanced role
for the regions in the preparation of regional plans. This observation is consistent
with the findings of Coyle and Sinnott (1992) which likewise point to the limited
ambitions of regional actors.
Arguably, Midland Regional Authority (1998) presented the most sophisticated
critique of regional devolution in Ireland. It begun its submission to the National
Development Plan by criticising the role the regional authorities had been asked to
play to date as placing them in a “helpless position as regards having any ongoing
influence” (Midland Regional Authority, 1998: 81). Whilst an improvement, the
recent decision to allow regional authorities to sit on the overall Community Support
Framework monitoring committee and the monitoring committees of all Operational
Programmes was not enough. Midland Regional Authority offered four further rec-
ommendations which would empower the regional tier with greater teeth:
1. Once data for the national plan had been collected, a process of integrating sectoral
and regional submissions should be commenced. This would result in a number
of coherent, identifiable packages of expenditure at regional level;
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2. Provision should be made for the integrated monitoring of these packages through
careful data collection at the regional level and the establishment of a monitoring
evaluation group;
3. A technical officer should be appointed within each region with responsibility for
the co-ordination of these expenditure programmes and their monitoring;
4. At national level, a CSF monitoring sub-committee should be established to moni-
tor the development of regionally prescribed Operational Programmes.
In other words, the vision of the Midland Regional Authority was that of grounding
national sectoral programmes more within a regional framework and giving an
enhanced role to the regional authorities to design and monitor these area based pack-
ages.
Whilst animated by the context created by Agenda 2000 and the possibility that
Ireland might pursue a regionalisation strategy, it would be incorrect to presume that
regional armatures in the proposed Objective 1 area were in themselves ever likely
to be powerful enough to bring about change. As noted above, power in Ireland lies
primarily in the Houses of the Oireachtas. It is towards controversies played out in
both the Da´il and the Seanad that attention now turns.
The summer of discontent
The regionalisation debate first announced its arrival in Da´il E´ ireann on April 29th
1998. In a guarded statement on the government’s position, Minister for Finance
Charles McCreevy argued:
“I have never given the definitive line the government is likely to pursue because
it has not yet decided on its strategy% the government’s objective in this round
of Structural Funds will be to secure for Ireland the optimum level of funding.
If that means going down the route of sub-regionalisation, subject to the Com-
mission’s agreement, then that is the route the government will go.” (C.
McCreevy, T.D. for Kildare North, Minister for Finance, Fianna Fa´il, Da´il
Debates, 29/4/98)
Crucially then, and from the outset, it was clear that for the government, regionalis-
ation would be approached first and foremost as an exercise in subsidy shopping.
The strategy of regionalisation was the subject of further motions which were
comprehensively debated in the Da´il on June 11th and November 11th 1998, and
the Seanad on May 27th, June 3rd, and October 15th 1998. A key feature of these
debates was the manner in which politicians lined up on territorial rather than party
political lines. With some exceptions, it was those T.D.s and Senators from the pro-
posed Objective 1 in transition area who emerged as principal opponents of the
regionalisation strategy. While the Labour Party appeared to have a united position
on regionalisation — they sought to reject it — this again reflected the fact that the
party’s support base was rooted in the working class neighbourhoods of Dublin,
Cork and Limerick, cities which lay outside the BMW region. Regionalisation proved
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to emphasise a form of turf politics, where defence of one’s geographical constitu-
ency became more important than adhering to a party line. Whilst in the end strong
centralised party controls triumphed, for some time, a cross-party territorial bloc
of T.D.s in the Objective 1 in transition region exerted considerable pressure on
the government.
The principal concern among T.D.s and Senators who were opposed to the
regionalisation strategy was that it would lead to substantial reductions in funds for
Objective 1 in transition areas. This was despite government assurances that: “if a
part of the country were to qualify for Objective 1 as a result of the proposed reclassi-
fication, this would not mean the rest of the country would be treated any less favour-
ably than it would have been anyway under the transition regime currently proposed
for Ireland as a single region” (C. McCreevy, Da´il Debates, 10/11/98). The belief
that the division of the country would have detrimental effects on the most populous
Southern and Eastern regions nevertheless remained pervasive throughout the sum-
mer of 1998. Its persistence was to lead commentators from BMW constituencies
to wonder aloud as to why it continued to be in circulation and whose interests it
was serving:
“Because of their misunderstanding of the question or a narrow vested political
interest, some commentators have muddied waters and made the debate baffling
to many citizens% Some Deputies may misunderstand the regionalisation pro-
posal and genuinely fear their region or the disadvantaged sections of society in
general will lose out. I share that concern but believe the fear is a groundless one
in this instance. Others may understand the regionalisation proposal quite well
but may not be above using a bit of scaremongering for short-term electoral advan-
tage.” (C. O’Caolain, T.D. for Cavan Monaghan, Sinn Fe´in, Da´il Debates,
10/11/98)
In their efforts to avoid what they perceived would be significant reductions in
EU transfers to their areas, opponents of regionalisation made use of three principal
debating strategies. In each case, as the debates evolved, the government developed
three equally strong lines of response. First, some called for the government to
attempt to secure Objective 1 status again for the whole country, using Ireland’s
GNP/GDP ratio as a basis for pleading a special case. This case was to be buttressed
by the observation that transport costs are greater for Ireland since it is the only
island economy in the EU, and that Ireland suffers from severe infrastructural back-
wardness.
Ireland’s GNP is substantially lower than its GDP due to its disproportionate
reliance on multi-national enterprises. As a result of significant repatriation of profits,
some commentators believed that the decision to award Objective 1 status on the
basis of GDP was unfair (O’Leary, 1998, 1999). This line of argument, however,
was dismissed by the government as unlikely to meet with sympathy from fellow
European negotiators. Further, while it might draw regions other than the BMW
group beneath the Objective 1 threshold, the country as a whole would still breach
the guidelines:
753M. Boyle / Political Geography 19 (2000) 737–769
“The fact of the matter is that the indicator chosen for Objective 1 status must
be one that commands support and acceptance across the European Union. GDP
per-capita meets this requirement and in the negotiations to date there has be no
pressure by any member state to open up this issue% In any event, Ireland’s per
capita GNP, expressed as a percentage of the EU average, has been over 75%
for several years now.” (C. McCreevy, Da´il Debates, 10/11/98)
Secondly, some opponents suggested that while their region as a whole could not
qualify for Objective 1 status, “blackspots” at a more micro scale could and therefore
deserved to be included as part of a more complex map. This theme was unsurpris-
ingly championed to the greatest degree by the Labour Party whose support base
derives from these blackspots. The result of the regionalisation strategy otherwise
would be “a dividing of the country and the setting of the disadvantaged rural dweller
against his [sic] urban equivalent” (Senator J. Costello, Labour Party, Seanad
Debates, 15/10/98). In a stout defence of the impossibility of this strategy, the
government again dismissed it as worthy of serious consideration:
“Any new NUTS II level — the reference regime for Objective 1 status — must
be generally in line, as regards population and size, with the norm across the EU.
Its components must also be geographically contiguous. This means that the option
of designating micro-regions, such as poverty blackspots within regions and cities,
to avail of Objective 1 funding for those particular areas is not available. In any
case, if it were possible to direct Objective 1 assistance to relatively poor urban
micro-regions, very wealthy areas of the community, such as the cities of London,
Paris, or Hamburg, would be able to seek Objective 1 status for their urban black-
spots. This would dissipate the overall allocations for Objective 1 assistance, and
reduce the amount available for Ireland.” (C. McCreevy, Da´il Debates, 10/11/98)
Finally, some opponents warned that if Southern and Eastern regions were
excluded, then domestic funds would have to flow into them to offset losses. This
kind of pleading brought promises of funding from the government, with the general
proviso that exchequer transfers be in line with the broader goals of national econ-
omic development. Further, it allowed the government to distract attention away
from the importance of the regional distribution of EU transfers, by focusing instead
on the entire spending package available through the next National Development
Plan. T.D.s and Senators from Southern and Eastern regions could be satisfied that
even if regionalisation went ahead, their regions would not lose out overall:
“As long as we continue with the prudent policies which have played a major
part in securing the economic growth of recent years, we should have the resources
to make good the reduction in EU aid for the country as a whole.” (C. McCreevy,
Da´il Debates, 10/11/98)
By the end of the summer of 1998, therefore, while not declaring its hand, the
government had began formulating defences of the regionalisation strategy against
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each of the lines of contention advanced by its opponents. Frustrated by their lack
of progress, some opponents attempted to take matters into their own hands. As late
as November 1998, Labour T.D. for Dublin North West, P. De Rossa was reported
in The Irish Times (10/11/98) as having asked the Department of Finance, under the
Freedom of Information Act, for copies of official records concerning the relative
advantages or disadvantages of the two regions strategy. Bitter about the govern-
ment’s failure to countenance serious debate, he is quoted as saying: “The Depart-
ment listed 10 documents or papers that had been produced on this issue but my
application was refused on the grounds that ‘public disclosure would be contrary to
the public interest’, and would also ‘risk adversely the international relations of the
state in so far as the EU is concerned’”.7
Concern over regional devolution
Given Ireland’s history of over centralisation and the stranglehold that the Depart-
ment of Finance has had on EU funding, both proponents and opponents of
regionalisation persisted in reminding the government about the EU’s attachment of
conditions in the disbursement of Structural Funds. A key debate was initiated on
the assumption that; “Given their present make-up, the regional authorities are inad-
equate% Does the government have the will to devise an effective sub-regional
scheme that will be empowered to draw down objective one status?” (Senator P.
Burke, Fine Gael, Seanad debates, 27/5/98). For proponents of regionalisation, the
fear was that their case might be undermined if genuine regional administrations
were not put in place. For opponents, the concern was that Ireland might antagonise
the European Union by appearing to be dividing the country merely to “subsidy
shop”, and thereby threaten overall transfers. The following quote, offered by an
opponent of regionalisation, exemplifies such concerns:
“If one is not going to allow any form of serious devolution of power to the
regions, there is no way one can hope to persuade Brussels to recognise our
regions%. Eurocrats, in spite of all their limitations, operate according to a certain
logic. If regions are alleged to exist, Brussels wants them identified, defined in
law, and given independent powers to make decisions about themselves%. Given
that the Department of Finance has such an obsession with controlling the expen-
diture of every other government department, how will it allow a regional auth-
ority in the deprived parts of Connacht or Munster to have the sort of autonomy
Brussels would expect? I am quite convinced that the Department would happily
forgo Objective 1 status rather than concede to direct regional negotiations with
Brussels as such negotiations would take the power out of the Department’s
hands.” (Senator B. Ryan, Labour, Seanad Debates 3/6/98)
The extent to which the success of the application to regionalise the country would
7 The Irish Times, “Government responds to regionalisation claims” 10/11/98.
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depend upon the creation of new regional structures was pressed home further in an
interview published in The Irish Times (16/9/98) with EU Commissioner for Regional
Affairs, Monika Wulf-Mathies. In this interview, Wulf-Mathies was asked what she
thought of the regionalisation debate raging in Ireland. She observed:
“I can well understand how people are trying to defend current levels of financial
support. It would be a nice idea if more funding was to be forthcoming this way,
to organise the country like that. But I think this would only be possible, and this
has always been the position of the Commission, if it went hand in hand with
changes in political and decision making structures in the regions — with devol-
ution taking place not only to get better structural funding, but as a real change
in the legislative and regional make up of the country. So far I see interest in
getting as much money as possible, but don’t yet see this corresponding with
changes in regional governance.”8
The force of this argument led the government to eventually concede that:
“In the event of a regionalisation approach being adopted, the regional adminis-
trative framework may require adjustment. Such adjustment as is necessary will
be the subject of discussion with the Commission and will take account of the
views of the regional interests. A major consideration in this general regard is
that the efficient and effective administration and management of Structural Funds
spending, for which Ireland enjoys a just reputation, must not be jeopardised,
particularly in the coming period of declining overall assistance from Europe.
Notwithstanding this, the government would, I believe, be prepared to give any
new regional structures a real role in the preparation, management, and monitoring
of the regional components of the National Development Plan.” (C. McCreevy,
Da´il Debates, 10/11/98)
Despite official sentiments like these, many commentators remained unconvinced.
The results of an “Expert Survey” of the policy positions of Ireland’s main political
parties in 1997, for instance, testifies to a widespread belief among informed com-
mentators that not only was decentralistion of government functions a low priority,
but that in any event, there was a deep seated reluctance to countenance substantial
devolution per se (Laver, 1998).
The decision to adopt a regionalisation approach
On November 17th 1998, Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern issued a press release
finally confirming that the Government had “decided today to pursue an application
to Eurostat% for a change from Ireland’s current status as a single region to one
8 The Irish Times, “The problems of division” 16/9/98.
756 M. Boyle / Political Geography 19 (2000) 737–769
comprising two regions”.9 Employing their essential barometer of maximising EU
transfers, the government it seemed, had finally accepted that regionalisation was
the optimum strategy to adopt. Contained in the Taoiseach’s press release, neverthe-
less, were two additional points which were to generate further controversy.
First, as expected, Objective 1 status was proposed for the BMW region, but in
addition, two further Counties were added; Clare and Kerry. Although having GDP
per capita figures above 75% of the EU average (in 1995, Clare, 88%; Kerry, 102%),
when connected to the BMW group, the overall average remained less than the
critical threshold for Objective 1 status. According to the government:
“The inclusion of Clare and Kerry in the regional authority area of the West, which
was under consideration from the outset of the examination of regionalisation and
was mooted in documents circulated to Departments during the summer, will
ensure that the new Objective 1 region will encompass the western seaboard from
Donegal to Kerry, an area on the very periphery of the European Union.”10
The decision to include Clare and Kerry raised a political storm. Many commen-
tators believed that the government had been coerced by the activities of Independent
T.D. for Kerry South Jackie Healy-Rae. According to Ireland Today (19/11/98),
support by Healy-Rae for the weak coalition government (Table 2) was so vital that
he could exert power; “the inclusion of Kerry smacks of what is known as “stroke
politics”. Many people, rightly or wrongly, believe that Deputy Jackie Healy-Rae,
Independent from South Kerry, made the inclusion of Kerry in the “poorer” region
a condition of his continued support for the minority government.”11 Of course, given
the need for regions to be geographically coterminous, Clare then also had to be
Table 2
Status of parties making up the 28th Da´il at November 17th 1999a
Party No. of T.D.s
Fianna Fa´il 76
Fine Gael 54
Labour 21
Progressive Democrats 4
Green Alliance 2
Socialist Party 1
Sinn Fe´in 1
Independents/others 7
Total 166
a Fianna Fa´il and Progressive Democrats rule as a weak coalition government. Four additional votes
from other parties or Independent T.D.s are needed to carry a vote. Source: WWW.irlgov.ie/
9 Press release, Taoiseach’s Office, “Regionalisation” 17/11/98.
10 ibid.
11 Ireland Today, “National interest versus local interest”, 19/11/98.
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included to make Kerry’s inclusion “look” logical (Fig. 2). The precarious arithmetic
of Da´il E´ ireann, it seemed, was driving the proposal.
Other Independent T.D.s who supported the government were now reputed to be
reconsidering their position. According to Ireland Today (24/11/98):
“The news this morning that Independent Deputy for Wicklow, Mildred Fox, is
considering withdrawing her support is a lesson for the government that if you
give to one, you have to give to everybody%. Together, the Progressive Demo-
crats and Fianna Fa´il have eighty seats in the Da´il and are requiring the votes of
four Independents at every vote to help them through%. Expect promises of an
extension of the DART to Newtonmount Kennedy and roads around the sugarloaf
in a bid to keep her onside.”12
Indeed, there was so much anger within the Fianna Fa´il Party that Bertie Ahern and
Charles McCreevy called a meeting with the parliamentary party at Leinster House
on November 19th 1999 at which 40 members attended. They denied that Jackie
Healy-Rae had swayed their decision and noted that the idea had been mooted in
Department of Finance discussions in July. The politics of turf threatened to dominate
once more then, with support for the coalition rather than party allegiance being
placed under threat on this occasion.
A second controversial point arising from the press release was that while the
government made explicit that it had decided that a revised regional structure was
needed, it was clear that it had no vision of what this structure might entail, nor had
made any plans to implement changes in the near future. Despite an exhaustive
debate on the issue, for some, the government still had failed to realise the urgency
of creating new regional bodies for the success of the venture:
“Commissioner Monika Wulf-Mathies is on record as saying that there would
need to be a greater involvement of local government in development activity
than is currently the case before the Commission would agree to this kind of
regionalisation. Otherwise it would seem, the Commission would regard the pro-
posed regionalisation as ‘subsidy shopping’ and therefore totally unacceptable.
The Minister for Finance apparently envisages ‘light’ regional structures whatever
that may mean. On November 17th, the Taoiseach said in the Da´il that no legis-
lation would be required to give effect to the proposed regionalisation, which
leads me to conclude that he envisages no devolution of powers or influence over
planning or expenditure. It remains to be seen what the Commission’s reaction
to that will be.” (A. Dukes, T.D. for Kildare South, Fine Gael, Irish Times
20/11/98)13
In response to these criticisms, the Government issued a press release on February
12 Ireland Today, “Outfoxing the government the Wicklow way”, 24/11/99.
13 Irish Times, “Government’s ill prepared approach to regionalisation” 20/11/99.
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2nd 1999 providing more details of the planned new regional structures.14 Two new
NUTS II regions were to be created; Border, Midlands, and West Regional Authority
(including Kerry and Clare), and Southern and Eastern Regional Authority (Fig. 1).
They were to have four roles; to promote the co-ordination of the provision of public
services in their areas, to advise the government on the regional dimension of the
National Development Plan; to monitor the general impact of all EU programmes
of assistance under the CSF in their areas, and to manage new regional programmes
in the next CSF. This last aspect was particularly interesting for it suggested that,
for the first time, there would be some formal regional programming in the National
Development Plan. Membership of the new regional authorities was to be drawn
from elected representatives from the eight existing NUTS III regional authorities.
These authorities were to remain and maintain their functions. The press release
concluded that:
“The new structures at regional level will significantly increase the influence of
regional authorities in the development of the National Development Plan. It also
represents a significant devolution of responsibility to regional authorities% The
Government are now hopeful of an early response from Eurostat on its appli-
cation.”15
Despite being an improvement on what had existed before, the proposals remained
vague. There was no guidance as to whether NUTS II regional authorities were to
hold budgets and have power to decide expenditure. There was no indication of the
amounts of money to be spent on regional programmes. There were no details of
likely staffing levels. The relationships which would exist between NUTS II and
NUTS III regional authorities were not adequately specified. For many, therefore, the
advanced proposals represented nothing more than a cosmetic exercise, an attempt
to convince Eurostat that Ireland was addressing concerns while avoiding specific
commitments to empower the regions. Crucially, the official establishment of NUTS
II authorities was to occur under a Ministerial Order, rather than through primary
legislation. This was taken as proof that the government had no intention of getting
involved in a debate which would force them into genuine devolution.
Alleged political corruption: the Flynn affair
At this point, it is important to insert into the narrative a strand that proved influ-
ential in shaping the context within which decisions about Ireland’s application to
Eurostat were taken. Political corruption and sleaze have haunted the Fianna Fa´il
Party since the 1980s and the reign of “The Boss”, former Taoiseach Charles
Haughey (Collins & O’Raghallaigh, 1985; Sherriff, O’Brien, Punch & Cannon,
1998). Indeed the Progressive Democrats, the coalition party sustaining the govern-
14 Press release, Taoiseach’s Office, “New regional structures for regionalisation”, 2/2/99.
15 ibid.
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ment (Table 2), had been established precisely because some Fianna Fa´il members
had felt unable to continue in that Party. Across the period of 1997/1999, in particular
however, and crucially in the midst of EU negotiations, the stability of the govern-
ment was put under considerable strain by virtue of the rise of a whole series of
new corruption charges. Of particular significance was the Flood Tribunal, the latest
in a line of investigations into alleged payments made to politicians for planning fav-
ours.
In September 1998, Tom Gilmartin, a property developer, alleged that a donation
of IR£50,000 he had made to the Fianna Fa´il Party in the late 1980s had been
personally appropriated by Padraig Flynn, a former Fianna Fa´il Minister and then
Ireland’s sole EU Commissioner. Gilmartin claimed that he had been harassed by
Flynn who was extremely worried about what the allegations might do to his chances
of being re-nominated as Irish Commissioner. Faced with the allegation of political
sleaze Bertie Ahern, it was suggested, was already recognising the impossibility of
re-nominating Flynn. In early February 1999, Fine Gael tabled a Private Members’
Motion in the Da´il asking for immediate clarification of the allegations from Flynn
and recommending that if this was not forthcoming Flynn should be sacked as Com-
missioner.
On February 10th 1999, the Da´il debated a motion on Flynn’s position. In an
impressive speech T.D. Desmond O’Malley, a co-founder of the Progressive Demo-
crats, argued:
“the questions being posed for Mr Flynn are not complicated; they are simple,
straightforward, and easy to answer. And yet he declines to do so%. Is he hoping
that he will have been able to complete his term in Brussels before he is called
to give evidence in Dublin Castle? Why else would he refuse to explain himself?
What else does he have to fear from telling the truth%. The public are interested
to see revealed what the politicians of the 1980s got up to. But they are also
interested to see how those revelations will be dealt with by the politicians of
the 1990s.”16
The motion resulted in a call by the government for a full and immediate response
to the allegations from Flynn. On March 2nd 1999, Ahern read a one page fax to
the Da´il from Flynn indicating that his legal advisers had suggested that he should
not respond to the Da´il motion and instead keep his evidence for the Flood Tribunal.
This was to trigger further exchanges between the Da´il and Flynn, but without pro-
gress.
On Tuesday March 16th 1999, the affair was brought to an end in the most unex-
pected of circumstances. Following months of controversy, the EU Parliament forced
the 20-strong EU Commissioners to resign. The Parliament had refused to sign off
accounts for 1996 expenditure due to a raft of financial irregularities. While Flynn
16 The Irish Times, “Speech of Desmond O’Malley T.D. for Limerick East in Da´il E´ ireann on Private
Members’ Motion to force Padraig Flynn to make a public statement on allegations of fraud” 12/2/99.
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was not directly involved in charges of corruption among EU Commissioners, the
decision to resign en masse offered him the opportunity of a graceful exit. He would
not be re-appointed but would remain with the other Commissioners in a caretaker
capacity until September 1999.
The impact of the whole affair on the outcome of Ireland’s negotiations over
Agenda 2000 is impossible to establish. It did, nevertheless, mediate negotiations in
at least two ways. First, the erosion of the relationship between Flynn and the Fianna
Fa´il Party must have undermined the effectiveness with which Ireland was able to
lobby. On March 10th 1999 in a debate in the Da´il, Ahern was asked explicitly
whether his relationship with Flynn was becoming detrimental to the Irish case. He
indicated that he had met with Flynn only once since Christmas 1998 but defended
his position by saying, “I do not need to talk to the Commissioner to obtain his
insights and information”. Other commentators were less convinced. The Irish Times
on February 5th 1999, for instance, carried an article titled; “Bad time for a public
dispute with Flynn”. It continued:
“this is an exceptionally bad time to have such a bitter and public row between
the government and the Irish member of the European Commission, Mr Padraig
Flynn. Whilst Commissioners are not constitutionally representatives of the mem-
ber states, everyone knows they play an essential role in mediating and communi-
cating between Brussels and national capitals.”17
Second, on February 26th 1999, and in part as a consequence of public perception
of the affair, The Irish Times published a poll showing that despite a buoyant econ-
omy, support for Fianna Fa´il had dropped 8% points to 48% in four months, with
the Taoiseach’s personal rating falling from 81% to 70%.18 The poll also suggested
that 51% of voters wanted an election if allegations could be proven. The already
weak coalition government was on the verge of collapse. The consequence was that
it became even more important for Fianna Fa´il to keep Independent T.D.s like Jackie
Healy Rae on side. They had to persist with their inclusion of Clare and Kerry in
the application to Eurostat. Furthermore, the government came under more pressure
to resolve the Agenda 2000 negotiations satisfactorily to prove that their handling
of the Flynn affair was not to the detriment of Ireland.
Negotiation and compromise with the EU Commission
On February 24th 1999, Eurostat formally rejected Ireland’s application to create
two NUTS II regions. The rejection, it was argued, was based firstly upon Eurostat’s
belief that the addition of Kerry and Clare represented a cobbled together effort to
maximise EU transfers, and secondly, the failure of Ireland to erect new regional
17 The Irish Times, “Bad time for public dispute with Flynn”, 5/2/99.
18 The Irish Times, “FF support drops 8 points in four months”, 26/2/99.
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structures which reflected genuine devolution. Amidst an avalanche of criticisms,
led by Fine Gael and the Labour Party, The Irish Times on March 1st reported:
“Not unexpectedly, the Government’s clumsy and ill-conceived exercise in sup-
posed ‘regionalisation’ has hit the buffers in Brussels. Eurostat,% is not convinced
that counties Clare and Kerry should be eligible for the maximum level of EU
funding. Critically, Eurostat is also sceptical about the government’s commitment
to fully-fledged regional power% Eurostat sees the regional structures for what
they are: a token effort inspired centrally by the need to optimise receipts from
EU Structural Funds%. In truth, the government has only itself to blame. For a
decade and more the Commission has championed an approach whereby the allo-
cation and distribution of EU Structural Funds is channelled through proper
regional structures%. The government has responded to this with a minimalist
approach to regionalisation drawn up by the Department of Finance, which yields
little substantial powers to the regions.”19
This kind of thinking was to become central to the debates which followed. In
reality, Eurostat is confined in its decision making to statistical criteria only and the
decision over splitting the country in two ought to have come down simply to the
capacity of the proposed area to meet EU guidelines for Objective 1 status. The
drive for regional governance is championed by the Commission who ought to have
had no influence on the decision making process. What marked out the Irish analysis
however, was a suspicion that the Commission had shaped Eurostat’s decision
because of the failure of Ireland to give due credit to devolution in particular.
Whether this kind of thinking had any basis in reality is largely irrelevant. Opposition
parties jumped on suspicions and critique was constructed on the basis that Eurostat
had judged the case on political grounds.
In a debate in the Da´il on March 3rd 1999, some valuable insights can be obtained
regarding the government’s commitment to regional devolution. Despite the earlier
promise, no Ministerial Order had yet been signed to set up the two new NUTS II
authorities. Minister for Local Government Noel Dempsey was relentlessly goaded
by Labour and Fine Gael as to why the new regions had not been established. It
was clear that if Eurostat could not be convinced to change its decision, the new
authorities might not be set up at all. They had to be understood therefore, as being
nothing more than an exercise in political opportunism:
ND — It was made clear at the time that consultations were ongoing with Eurostat
and the European Commission and that once final details were agreed, the two
regions would be established.
19 The Irish Times, “Regional policy in flitters”, 1/3/99.
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EG — This is news. I understood on 10th February, when the government
announced the establishment of two new so-called group regions, that this decision
had been arrived at by government following a lengthy period of deliberation
since last July, was independent of anything happening in Eurostat, and was based
on the regional needs of the country%. May I take it that the two regions will
be established not on the basis of national policy but on the basis of what Eurostat
and the European Commission tell the Government% Who is running this coun-
try?
ND — We are%.
EG — Eurostat%. There is no other country which would allow regions to be
set up by Eurostat.
(N. Dempsey (ND), T.D. for Meath, Minister for the Environment and Local
Government, Fianna Fa´il, and E. Gilmore (EG), T.D. for Du´n Laoghaire, Labour:
Da´il Debates, 1/3/99)
The Government reacted angrily to the Eurostat decision, and even though sur-
prised by the bluntness of the response, indicated that the battle was not over. It
remained committed to the original application and Bertie Ahern arranged to meet
Jacques Santer on the matter, Charles McCreevy wrote a letter of protest to the
Economic Affairs Commissioner, Mr Yves Thibault de Silguy, and high level
officials in the Dublin Government arranged a top level meeting with Eurostat
officials. Commenting upon these gestures, The Irish Times of March 1st reported:
“For all this brave talk there is a definite sense that the government has burnt its
bridges in Brussels% and is engaged in a rearguard action”.20 Going into the final
phase of discussions on Agenda 2000 therefore, the Irish government had to revise
its thinking and devise a strategy for the final assault.
The chief stance taken was to empathise with those countries (particularly
Germany) who were concerned with contributions, but to seek as much of what
assistance was available. Ireland was accepting that it would suffer shortfalls but
was looking for a “soft landing”. In press coverage, Ahern publicly declared that he
was seeking a deal of around 4 billion ECU. Among the most critical aspects of his
“bottom line” were:
“a recognition that Ireland’s recent economic growth had occurred only since
1993, that there was, therefore, a need to look beyond the figures to recognise
the serious infrastructural problems which remained, and the need for continued
20 ibid.
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help to consolidate growth. At a minimum, Ireland needed: acceptance of the
partition of the country into Objective 1 and Objective 1 in transition regions;
adequate transition arrangements in the transition region, and continued eligibility
for the Cohesion Fund.”21
Ireland’s movement towards a negotiated compromise was met by a reciprocal
movement by the German government. Chancellor Gerard Schroeder faced a number
of pressures which encouraged a softening of the German position, and given their
Presidency of the EU, this encouraged a similar approach from most net contributors.
Schroeder was operating a week after the resignation of his Finance Minister Oscar
Lafontaine and one month after the entire Commission resigned for corruption, and
fearing what a botched summit might do for further devaluation of the already fragile
and tumbling new Euro currency, had a mind to broker a compromise. Shifts in the
German position were beginning to generate optimism in Ireland that the new context
might encourage Eurostat to accept at least a version of the regionalisation strategy.
The Irish Times of March 21st 1999 announced that Eurostat had provisionally
agreed to a modified regionalisation proposal, which excluded Clare and Kerry, ahead
of the final summit scheduled for Berlin on March 24–26th. Then, in an article
extolling the virtues of the Irish government, on March 22nd, Ireland Today con-
firmed:
“The good news is that it now looks very positive that the EU will grant Objective
1 status to 13 counties in Ireland%. The bad news is that the counties of Kerry
and Clare will not be included%. People who understand how negotiations work
are saying that the Irish government has, once again, out-foxed the EU% Taoise-
ach Bertie Ahern knows how negotiations work. He knew there was little point
of putting forward 13 counties for Objective 1 status. Where could you negotiate
from that position? Ahern saw an opportunity to develop a negotiation position
that would solve several problems. By including two extra counties, he was able
to bring Independent Deputy Jackie Healy-Rae of Kerry firmly onto the govern-
ment’s side, whilst giving him room to compromise with the EU% The Irish
government has retained, against all odds, Objective 1 status for 13 counties%.
This could go down as a ‘masterstroke’ in EU negotiations.” 22
Instead of being arrogant and complacent and mishandling the original application,
the government, it appeared, had got it right after all. The coalition was strengthened
going into the Berlin negotiations. On Friday March 26 after gruelling negotiations
at Berlin, agreement was reached by all European governments regarding the final
accommodation which was to endure between 2000 and 2006. Reporting back to the
Da´il on April 1st 1999, Finance Minister Charles McCreevy was in self congratulat-
21 Press release, Taoiseach’s Office, “Statement by the Taoiseach Mr Bertie Ahern T.D. in advance of
the opening of the negotiations on Agenda 2000”, 21/2/99.
22 Ireland Today, “Success or failure”, 22/3/99.
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ory mood. McCreevy pointed to four major results of the Berlin negotiations which
bore direct relevance to Ireland:
1. EU transfers to Ireland across the period 2000–2006 would amount to 12.7
billion Euro.
2. Ireland would continue to retain entitlement to Cohesion Funds subject to a mid-
term review in 2003.
3. Ireland’s total share of Structural Funds would be around 4.25 billion Euro.
4. Finally, and of greatest significance in the present context, the regionalisation
proposal would be accepted (subject to the exclusion of Clare and Kerry) and net
Ireland an additional 590 million Euro.
In other words, against expectations and events conspiring against the government,
Ireland could take satisfaction from doing well in the Berlin negotiations. It had
succeeded in securing a reasonable outcome (compare with the projections of Bren-
nan (1998), for instance), a modified version of the regionalisation strategy had been
accepted, and it would get the “soft landing” it desired. Ireland would still emerge
as one of the biggest losers in the new programming period but losses would not
be as great as perhaps initially feared.
Conclusion: a reading of Ireland’s experience
Until 1998, Europe’s insistence upon a role for regional and local actors clearly
had little impact upon Ireland’s institutional apparatus, despite the fact the country
was drawing down substantial Structural Funds. A combination of the new context
created by Agenda 2000 and the accelerated progress of the Irish economy from
1993, however, evidently afforded the EU Commission a new opportunity to force
the Irish state into a reconsideration of the role of regional actors. The Irish govern-
ment was dedicated towards maximising intake from EU transfers. Given the state’s
history of over centralisation and the key role played by the Department of Finance
in previous rounds of Structural Funds, however, it lacked an appetite for the kinds
of devolution demanded by the Commission. Its own proposals, whilst furnishing
regions with greater responsibility, clearly fell short of the European ideal.
The stalemate was to break in a compromise struck in the run-up to the Berlin
summit. It seemed that Ireland had managed to face down the EU Commission.
Whilst the Commission succeeded in ensuring that the two new NUTS II regions
had nominal integrity, it failed to extract a detailed commitment to extended
empowerment of regional actors. Against the backdrop of a legitimation crisis among
EU Commissioners and a struggling Euro currency, Eurostat agreed in March 1999
to much the same regionalisation proposal it had rejected in February 1999. The
tapestry of NUTS III regional authorities had been successfully deployed as part of
an exercise in subsidy shopping
In ending this paper, it is worthwhile reflecting upon three issues which would
appear to have wider significance to other case studies of the role of Euro-regionalism
765M. Boyle / Political Geography 19 (2000) 737–769
in the re-scaling of regional governance in member states. First, it is clear that the
existing scale division of the Irish state rendered regional and local actors so impotent
that they lacked the capacity to wrestle power from Dublin. Regional armatures in
Ireland were animated by the circumstances in which the Irish state found itself but
their historical weakness militated against their capacity to make a difference to the
evolution and outcome of debates. Indeed so weak is regional governance in Ireland
that its aspirations have been limited towards encouraging the state to move away
from national/sectoral and towards spatial/regional planning. At no stage were the
concepts of regional suffrage and a substantial devolution of decision making powers
seriously countenanced even by regions themselves.
In an effort to explain the limited ambitions of regional actors, it is useful to
revisit a number of concepts introduced above. In part, the relatively limited capacity
of regions to make a difference can be traced to the scale dependency of regional
actors. Rooted in the fortunes of the national economy, regional actors lack the kinds
of regional dependencies which, if shared by other non-state actors, might have suc-
ceeded in stimulating them to embark upon more vociferous and ambitious poli-
ticking. This said, the dependency of sub-national actors on the central state might
in turn have been expected to create an interest in using EU funds to liberate the
regions from Dublin. MacLeod (1999), for example, has shown how regional actors
in Scotland have approached Euro-regionalism as a new “space of engagement”
(Cox, 1998b). Here, the jumping of scales creates a new kind of dependency which
can offer more security. It is clear that so weak are regional actors in Ireland that
they have lacked the resources and organisational capacity to think of Europe at this
stage as a new “space of engagement”.
The limited success of regions in capitalising on the context created by Agenda
2000, however, requires an explanation which surpasses the scale dependencies of
state and non-state actors. It has perhaps been the lack of a regional imaginary
to underpin the regionalisation strategy that has been its greatest downfall. Out of
convenience and as part of an exercise in subsidy shopping, Ireland attempted to
manufacture two regions from an existing regional structure which lacked cultural
integrity in the first instance. The BMW region represents little more than a “named”
economic space which makes sense only in terms of the rules of the game established
by Europe. Its discursive construction failed to stimulate any popular sense of loyalty
in a country that is already bereft of meaningful regional identities. It has been this
lack of a representational trope of the “region” that has undermined the possibility
of animating social blocs at the regional level. Reflecting upon the debates over
Agenda 2000 Liam Scollan, Chief Executive of the Western Development Com-
mission, observed:
“the scale of governance which we truly want at regional level will only be
determined when we have managed to discuss and understand fully the broader
distinctive character of different regions and the extent to which such a character
can be sustained and developed by more or less regional governance. Perhaps
there will always be poverty in our regional development policies unless they are
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built from strong social and cultural as well as economic foundations in the
regions.”23
Second, the tendencies for local interests to work through T.D.s in Ireland and,
therefore, to become de-localised, manifested itself in debates. In achieving national
agreement to pursue regionalisation, the Irish state had to act to ward off the threat
of a turf war that cut across party allegiance. The pursuit of regionalisation was at
the expense of commitments to T.D.s and Senators in Objective 1 in transition areas,
and particularly in the urban “blackspots”, that domestic resources would be allocated
to their locales to offset EU losses. A strong cross-party, territorial based alliance
managed to extract these commitments at the height of the “summer of discontent”.
The next National Development Plan therefore will need to start from the basis of
evening up imbalances created by EU transfers, irrespective of the EU’s principle
of “additionality” (Fitzpatrick Associates Economic Consultants, 1999a,b).
It would be misleading, however, to argue that turf politics overshadowed party
allegiance. It is questionable whether party allegiance was ever diluted to this extent.
Where the politics of space did emerge triumphant was in the context of the capacity
of an Independent T.D. to extract “favours” as a condition for his support of the
regionalisation strategy and the weak coalition government more generally.
Exploiting the fragility of the government, Independent T.D. Jackie Healy-Rae flexed
his muscles and forced the government to put the entire regionalisation proposal at
risk by including Clare and Kerry in the original application for Objective 1 status.
With its history of weak coalition governments, Ireland more so than other states,
would seem to be particularly vulnerable to this kind of triumph of spatial over
sectoral politics, constituency over party.
Finally, it is hoped that the narrative outlined above impresses the need to embrace
research methods which not only furnish insights into the messiness that surrounds
struggles over scales of governance, but also draws attention to the importance of
allowing for the contingent and conjunctural in analysis. In the above case study for
instance, the role of allegations of political corruption by Irish Commissioner Padraig
Flynn cannot be ignored. Not only did it further weaken the government but it threat-
ened to undermine the skill with which Ireland could negotiate a compromise. More-
over, the launching of the Euro and its poor performance allied with the mass resig-
nation of EU Commissioners played a crucial role in the compromise that was finally
brokered. Central to the process based approach therefore, must be a recognition that
from time to time contextual and happenstance events will surface and play a signifi-
cant role in the mediation of Euro-regionalism.
Writing about the influence of Structural Fund transfers to Ireland in the period
1987 to 1996, Brigid Laffan has argued that while not responsible for institutional
changes of consequence, “EU monies have disturbed territorial politics in Ireland”
[Italics added] (Laffan, 1996: 320). The evidence presented in this paper suggests
23 Liam Scollan, Chief Executive of the Western Development Commission, personal communi-
cation, 25/11/99.
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that the Euro-regionalism project has been considerably more disturbing for the Irish
government since 1996. Euro-regionalism forced the government into a highly public
debate about the future status to be accorded to regional authorities. It is perhaps a
sad testimony, nevertheless, that even in the midst of extraordinary levels of pressure,
the scale division of labour within the Irish state remains overwhelmingly centralist,
with only a marginal strengthening of the existing base of regional governance. The
EU Commission, it seems, lacked the political will to fully capitalise upon the tem-
porary shift in the balance of power in its favour.
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